01338nam a2200145 a 450000500170000000800400001710000150005724500580007226400160013033600090014633800200015552009050017550600460108085600660112620260901030336.0250101s2019    xx     o     000 0 eng d1 aYuzhe Tang10aAuthenticated Key-Value Stores with Hardware Enclaves 1barXivc2019  atext  aonline resource  aAuthenticated data storage on an untrusted platform is an important computing paradigm for cloud applications ranging from big-data outsourcing, to cryptocurrency and certificate transparency log. These modern applications increasingly feature update-intensive workloads, whereas existing authenticated data structures (ADSs) designed with in-place updates are inefficient to handle such workloads. In this paper, we address this issue and propose a novel authenticated log-structured merge tree (eLSM) based key-value store by leveraging Intel SGX enclaves. We present a system design that runs the code of eLSM store inside enclave. To circumvent the limited enclave memory (128 MB with the latest Intel CPUs), we propose to place the memory buffer of the eLSM store outside the enclave and protect the buffer using a new authenticated data structure by digesting individual LSM-tree levels. We des0 aOpen access — freely available to read.40uhttps://arxiv.org/pdf/1904.12068v3yRead the full paper (PDF)