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| 005 | 20260901030337.0 | ||
| 008 | 250101s2019 xx o 000 0 eng d | ||
| 100 | 1 | _aYachen Tang | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | _aInference of Tampered Smart Meters with Validations from Feeder-Level Power Injections |
| 264 | 1 |
_barXiv _c2019 |
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| 336 | _atext | ||
| 338 | _aonline resource | ||
| 520 | _aTampering of metering infrastructure of an electrical distribution system can significantly cause customers' billing discrepancy. The large-scale deployment of smart meters may potentially be tampered by malware by propagating their agents to other IP-based meters. Such a possibility is to pivot through the physical perimeters of a smart meter. While this framework may help utilities to accurately energy consumption information on the regular basis, it is challenging to identify malicious meters when there is a large number of users that are exploited to vulnerability and kWh information being altered. This paper presents a reconfiguration switching scheme based on graph theory incorporating the concept of distributed generators to accelerate the anomaly localization process within an electrical distribution network. First, a data form transformation from a visualized grid topology to a | ||
| 506 | 0 | _aOpen access — freely available to read. | |
| 856 | 4 | 0 |
_uhttps://arxiv.org/pdf/1904.13208v1 _yRead the full paper (PDF) |
| 942 | _cERES | ||
| 999 |
_c655 _d655 |
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